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THE REFUGEE JURIST AND AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 779 tellectual communities. And it places in proper context tributes to dmigr~s who eventually carved out niches in American academia. 7 The story that follows begins with a brief overview of the relationship between German and American legal education (and educators) before Hitler's rise to power. Part II then explores American law faculties' reaction to the Nazis' initial purge of German universities. Part of this response involved decisions whether and in what manner to host a displaced scholar or scholars. The article details some of the first connections made between foreign jurists and American law schools. A few of these associations worked out well; others did not. These experiences were both influenced by and influences upon concurrent developments in American legal education, as detailed in Part III. Because of these changes, displaced scholars who called upon American law schools later in the 1930s and in the early 1940s sought entry into a very different environment than that of just a few years before. Part IV of this article discusses how the changes that had occurred worked to the benefit of some foreign scholars, but to the detriment of most. Finally, this article concludes with a brief overview of the respective positions of the American law professor and the 6migr6 jurist on the eve of America's entry into World War. II.
I.
The American law professor carved out his unique academic niche in the late 1800s and early 1900s. In this formative period of professional development, instructors in law labored to establish their craft as a discipline worthy of inclusion in the university. The "hard work and effective propaganda" 8 they directed toward this goal incorporated a view of their work that hearkened to the spirit of German scientism. 9 Establishing the scientific bona fides of their craft was a professional imperative since, as Christopher Langdell said in 1887, "If law be not a science, a university will consult its own dignity in declining to teach it."1° German law professors provided American scholars with particularly attractive professional role models because they had successfully cast their work as a "scientific" endeavor and ate utility to the private practitioner." 1 7 But interest in the field reemerged in the 1920s and early 1930s,1 8 concomitant with a view that legal study should be approached as if law were a social science not too different from sociology, anthropology or psychology. The resurgent interest in comparative law encouraged interaction among law professors from different nations, and in doing so helped forge professional bonds between Continental and American jurists. In 1932, for example, more than thirty American law professors attended the International Congress of Comparative Law at The Hague. 1 9 Eleven of these delegates reported to the Association of American Law Schools that at the Congress they had "established acquaintanceship with kindred spirits in other countries, who will probably be willing to render scientific assistance in the study of legal problems." 20 This sort of announcement offered encouragement to foreign scholars seeking appointments or fellowships in the United States.
2 '
Similarly heartening were calls by prominent American law professors for increased instruction in foreign law. In his annual report for the 1929-1930 academic year, Columbia Law School Dean Young Smith wrote, "if law be regarded as a social institution, it transcends geographical lines and its study becomes a science. As such, the laws of Germany, of France, of Italy or of Argentina should offer much to the student whether he be in London or in New York." 2 2
Smith also perceived that America's legal system was essentially similar to those of other countries. In his report for 1929-1930, Smith opined, "When one considers the many similarities in other phases of the culture of western Europe and of the United States, it is difficult to believe that the differences in the systems of law which have been developed are as great as is commonly assumed." 23 Trustees 90, 104 (1930) . In 1931, a substantial bequest allowed Columbia to launch the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law. Goebel, supra n. 15, at 330.
23. Smith, supra n. 22, at 103.
ars identified similarities across the approaches to legal study employed by foreign and American jurists. As Yale Law School Professor Edwin Borchard wrote in 1932, "It is fair to say that there is some evidence that the continental and American conceptions of legal technique are approaching a more common denominator." 2 4
For the most part, to be sure, foreign and comparative law remained peripheral to the American law-school curriculum in the 1920s and early 1930s. Yet expressions of camaraderie such as Smith's and Borchard's undoubtedly and understandably caused Continental teachers to believe that their American counterparts were at least somewhat interested in them and their work. When the situation in Germany took a turn for the worse, these assertions also suggested to displaced scholars that American law schools would welcome the opportunity to save them and the scientific tradition they embodied.
II.
On April 7, 1933, Germany's newly installed Nazi government enacted the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. This law summarily expelled most Jews and certain dissidents from government employment. 25 Since German universities were government-run, the Civil Service Law forced more than 1,200 professors from their posts. 26 The Civil Service Law and related persecution caused many deposed law teachers to look abroad for places where they might continue their academic careers. Though most of these scholars went to other European countries, a few, perhaps recalling conversations at The Hague or comments like Smith's, cast their eyes toward the United States.
These would-be 6migrds recognized that the Great Depression had led to belt-tightening by American law schools. 2 7 According to a study by the AALS, total expenditures by member schools fell from $5.6 million in 1931 to $4.6 million in 1933. 28 Even elite schools felt the pinch; the University of Chicago Law School's income dropped 30 Yale Law School, once teeming with empirical legal studies, slashed its research budget from more than $18,000 in 1929-1930 to less than $4,000 in 1936-1937. 3 1 Tensions provoked by the hard times also exacerbated the anti-Semitism already prevalent within American higher education. 3 2 As Harvard Law School Dean James Landis acknowledged in 1939, "There are anti-Semitic tendencies with reference to the introduction of Jews into the teaching staffs of most universities. The quota along that direction is also regarded by many of the universities as filled and they refuse to listen to any increase."33 Financial woes made law schools reluctant to take on new hires. Perhaps more important as far as the displaced scholars were concerned, the depression did more than just reduce institutional budgets; it also altered the balance among different sources of income. The depression chilled grant-making and reduced returns on endowments, causing most law schools to depend more heavily on student tuition and fees. At Yale Law School, for example, tuition and student fees provided only 46 percent of total income in 1930-1931, but 58 percent in 1936-1937. 34 Borchard captured the lack of student interest in these subjects in 1939 when he bluntly advised one foreign jurist, "As perhaps you do not know, German legal scholarship is not in excessive demand in this country. In a sense, it is something of a luxury for our universities." 4 2 Despite all of these grounds for pessimism, scholars displaced by the Nazis still believed that their American counterparts might aid them out of respect for German academia's "scientific reputation," 43 or, as Smith might have put it (and one refugee later did) to support "the common cause of the science of law."
44 Relief operations also offered hope. Not long after the purge of German universities, the Rockefeller Foundation and the newly formed Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars (created by the Institute of International Education) launched complementary programs designed to encourage American colleges and universities to host deposed scholars (across all disciplines) until the storm in Germany passed. 45 Both promised to subsidize the salaries bf refugee scholars chosen by academic institutions. Restricted grants, the organizations thought, would allow schools to provide refugees with temporary safe harbors without provoking resentment among native-born job-seekers or professors whose salaries had just been cut. 46 In theory, an institution had to petition the agencies for a grant, after identifying a particular scholar it wished to retain. In practice, the organizations often contacted schools to gauge their interest in recently dismissed talent. Since it was hoped that the crisis in Germany would soon pass, each scholars are in the field of Comparative Law. Unfortunately there are not a half dozen of these posts in the country, and most of them are occupied. Although he personally preferred a younger scholar, Clark acknowledged, "the general feeling in this country (which under the circumstances ought considerably to guide our course) is that the older men are immediately our obligation." 6 6 The Yale faculty first considered Ernst Levy, a Roman law expert at Heidelberg recommended by Llewellyn. Few professors knew anything about Levy or his work. Despite this, the faculty voted 11-5 to authorize Clark to speak with relief agencies about an appointment. 67 A few weeks later, Yale's at; tention shifted to Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a better-known scholar. 68 When the faculty discovered that Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had already accepted an offer to go to Oxford, interest in recruiting any foreign scholar lapsed. 69 Borchard and Llewellyn continued to press the issue, 70 but the subject was dead for the 1933-1934 academic year.
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As will be discussed in more detail later in this essay, a handful of American law professors at other schools also made inquiries with relief organizations and colleagues about the displaced scholars in the early and mid-1930s. '74 Northwestern University Law School Dean Leon Green apologetically rejected Thurman Arnold's letter on behalf of one displaced scholar, saying that although Northwestern was "not only sympathetic but very anxious" to host a refugee, the school could not do so because the "University is so hard pressed financially that the President and trustees will not commit themselves to anything." 75 At Harvard, still the country's pre-eminent law school, Frankfurter continued to champion the displaced scholars' cause throughout the decade, even making their plight the centerpiece of his keynote speech at the AALS's annual conference in 1935. 76 Most of Harvard faculty, on the other hand, had little desire to continue a series of failed experiments with foreign scholars. In 1932, Harvard had only with difficulty disengaged itself from Ernst Feilchenfeld, a German professor who Edmund Morgan later said had an "exceedingly unattractive personality" and who had wrongly thought himself in line for a permanent appointment art the school. And so for the most part, Harvard Law School kept its distance from refugee scholars in the mid-1930s. 79 The school nonetheless became closely associated with events overseas. In the summer of 1934, Dean Roscoe Pound toured the Austro-German border. Speaking to reporters, he remarked on what he considered a peaceful and proswith relief efforts but a lack of interest in hosting a displaced scholar, even with a grant).
74 perous scene. 80 Later that year, Pound received an honorary degree from Germany's ambassador to the United States on the steps of Harvard's Langdell Hall. New Harvard University President James Conant pointedly refused to be photographed with the ambassador at the ceremony. 8 ' Remarking on the event, as well as Pound's earlier comments, the New York Post described the dean as "a great legal scholar whose reputation has grown somewhat tarnished." 8 2 The New Republic wrote, "Dean Pound's action will be interpreted by German propagandists around the world as an answer to Nazi critics. ' 8 3 Harold Laski characterized Pound's decision to accept the degree as a "tragic lapse. ' 8 4 Pound's actions also infuriated Frankfurter. When Pound invited Frankfurter to the Langdell Hall ceremony, Frankfurter refused 8 5 and asked Conant to cancel the event. 8 6 Conant declined to do so, but confided to Frankfurter that he considered Pound (according to Frankfurter's recollection of their meeting) a "pathological" case. Despite the caution of some American law faculties and the indifference of others, U.S. law schools did come to host a significant share of the relatively small cohort of displaced jurists who sought refuge there in the early days of the Third Reich. These placements, though few and far between, suggested that American academia would not allow Hitler to extinguish German legal science, as exemplified by its leading practitioners. As already intimated by events at Yale Law School, however, time and experience would demonstrate that future appointments would hinge upon refugees' ability to meet their hosts' changing expectations far more than lingering respect for Continental scholarship.
Some schools met whatever obligation they perceived toward the displaced jurists by retaining one as a short-term research fellow, a lecturer, or a similarly jerry-rigged position. 88 The School of Juris- 89 Fewer schools retained deposed scholars with the intent that they would act in most respects as typical faculty members. Columbia acted first among elite law schools in recruiting a displaced scholar as a colleague. Keeping with the relief agencies' goal of facilitating the "rescue of science and learning," Columbia focused on a prominent German scholar. In November 1933, Dean Smith applied to the Rockefeller Foundation and Emergency Committee for grants to secure the services of Arthur Nussbaum, recently removed from the law faculty at Berlin. Viewed from afar, the fifty-six-year-old Nussbaum seemed to embody all that was praiseworthy about the German academic tradition. In his grant application to the Emergency Committee, Smith wrote (emphasis original):
[A]bove all, we should propose to have [Nussbaum] canvass what has been done (not so much what has been said) about realistic research in law in Germany in the last two decades, put the results together, and bring them to bear upon what has been done here. We know some of the German work, and know that it is good. We know that most of it is still unknown to us, and that all of it we need. 90 Borchard also recommended Nussbaum to the Emergency Committee, advising that the German's reputation would "add distinction to any faculty." 9 1 The Rockfeller Foundation, which husbanded its funds for top-rank scholars, checked with its German advisor to confirm Smith's view of Nussbaum. The wire back read, "Nussbaum very Jewish appearance but first rate scholar and character." 92 The Rockefeller Foundation and the Emergency Committee agreed to subsidize Nussbaum's stay at Columbia through the 1934-1935 academic year. 9 3 Columbia saw this as a temporary arrangement; it hoped that by mid-1935 conditions in Germany would improve sufficiently to permit Nussbaum's return. 9 4 In a similar development, slightly later and further west, the University of Michigan agreed to host Rudolf Laun of the University of Hamburg. 9 5 Reflecting the awkward liminal position of German public-law professors when transplanted into the American university, Laun would split his time between the University's Political Science Department and its Law School. 96 Laun and Nussbaum both had difficulty adjusting to what Loewenstein called the "ways and habits of American academic life." 97 These troubles would have been of little import if the scholars had been only short-term guests. But once it became clear that the situation in Germany was worsening, and that displaced scholars wished to form permanent connections with American universities, the 6migr~s' limitations became more problematic. At Columbia, although Nussbaum quickly established himself as a prolific author, his perceived inability to connect with American audiences caused his host to resist a more permanent connection with him. Once his initial stipend from the relief agencies expired, Nussbaum's friends (and especially Llewellyn and J.P. Chamberlain) struggled each year to piece together enough gift and grant money for him to stay at Columbia for another term. 98 They also looked to place him at another institution up through 1939, when Columbia finally gave him a more secure appointment as a research professor. 99 A similar story unfolded at Michigan, where Law School Dean Henry Bates considered Rudolf Laun a "fine scholar and gentleman," 10 0 but one who "could do little of value to any except a very few students." 10 1 Laun, in one observer's words, "could not adjust 93 himself to American standards"' 0 2 and was "unable to live up to expectations,"' 10 3 causing Michigan to cancel the course it had given Laun to teach. 10 4 After his initial stipend expired in 1935, Laun returned to Europe.' 0 5 He would spend the rest of the decade unsuccessfully appealing for another chance in America. 10 6 Columbia's experience with Nussbaum and Michigan's with Laun provided American law schools with cautionary advisement. The engagements seemed to confirm suspicions that German scholars either would not or could not learn American ways, including the English language.' 0 7 The experiences also chilled Michigan's and Columbia's enthusiasm for retaining any other foreign scholars, at least for a time. Substantial factions within the Michigan and Columbia faculties remained interested in comparative law throughout the 1930s.1 0 8 Yet both schools grew more cautious when it came to foreign scholars. Columbia turned toward re-educating young 6migr~s in American law. 10 9 At Michigan, Bates came to believe that American scholars were better qualified than 6migr~s to teach even comparative law, since in his view the latter group lacked the necessary baseline understanding of Anglo-American law. 110 Bates also became very sensitive to the moral obligations he saw as implicated in a refugee's appointment. In January 1936 he issued the following response to an inquiry from Loewenstein, by then in search of a new position:
I would be interested to meet you, but I ought to say frankly that the present prospect is that we shall not be able to make the Foundation support is withdrawn and the University may be in no position to pay the salary from its own resources. The resulting situation is very trying and embarrassing to all concerned. 1 1 ' The Michigan Law School faculty as a whole sent out mixed signals to foreign scholars throughout the 1930s. In December 1936, a faculty committee recommended that "the professional curriculum should be developed through the systematic use, as may be feasible and expedient, of materials derived from foreign legal systems as a basis for comparison with Anglo-American law." 112 Toward this end, the committee also recommended "[t]hat one or more professorships of comparative law be established, to which foreign trained legal scholars may be appointed, initially on a year to year basis." 1 3 After receiving this report, the full faculty resolved only to continue discussing what benefits would result from the presence of foreigntrained professors. 1 1 4 The Law School later voted to award a teaching fellowship to Riesenfeld, who by then had been promoted to a research associate position at the University of California. 1 5 But one week after so voting, the faculty engaged in a "thorough discussion as to the advisability of ... making Mr. Riesenfeld such an offer." 116 Later, the faculty voted to reverse itself and take back its decision to invite Riesenfeld to Ann Arbor. 117 Riesenfeld, of course, was just one of several young dmigr6 scholars who came to the United States in the early-to-middle 1930s. These individuals found it more difficult than their elders had to secure threshold spots within the American academic establishment. Conversely, they proved more capable than older refugees of adjusting to their changed circumstances. The two most prominent junior professors to come to America soon after the Nazi takeover were Max With Nussbaum already on board, Columbia was unwilling to make additional space for Rheinstein. 12 6 Columbia professors tried to help their younger visitor find a position elsewhere. They directed much of their effort toward Dean Harry Bigelow at the University of Chicago Law School. Rheinstein's advocates framed their arguments in practical terms. Richard Powell wrote Bigelow, "While I should not care to be quoted on this, I think that [Rheinstein] would do a substantially better job for us than some of the persons who are now on our staff.' 27 Llewellyn said that Rheinstein was "as good a bet as there is to be had. He is young enough to be resilient and adaptable; he also has the right kind of mind and personality for that purpose; his interest is truly comparative; (and) he already has a solid foundation in our own legal system. '12 8 Professors directed similar arguments toward the Rockefeller Foundation and the Emergency Committee. Chamberlain advised that Rheinstein was "the one" German scholar who "is really sought after quite eagerly by people here, not out of any sense of compassion for his difficult position at home, or any hostility to the Nazi government and its ways, but because of the contribution which it is believed he can make to our private laws." 1 2 9
As with the Yale Law School faculty, symbolic and political motives had not moved Bigelow to recruit a displaced scholar. If he was going to hire an 6migr6, that individual would have to be a competent instructor in American as well as foreign law. 130 The Columbia faculty's letters were sufficiently convincing on this point that Bigelow requested a grant on Rheinstein's behalf, 13 1 and the relief agencies supplied a one-year stipend. 13 2 Rheinstein's position at Chicago meant he did not have to return to Germany, at least not right away. On the other hand, no promises were made of a permanent appointment. Announcing Rheinstein's retention in his annual report for the 1933-1934 academic year, Bigelow characterized Rheinstein as merely a "temporary member" of the faculty, and noted that the Comparative Law and Civil Law courses the German would teach at Chicago were "not of an immediately utilitarian nature." 130. In October 1933, Bigelow listed the factors he considered important in evaluating a displaced scholar: (1) "The fields of law in which he has specialized"; (2) "The completeness of his common law training"; (3) "His interest in social and economic problems"; (4) "His ability as a teacher"; (5) "His adaptability and social characteristics"; (6) "His personal appearance"; and (7) It took some time to arrange the necessary funding. Kessler could still return to his previous position in Germany. The Rockefeller Foundation's German advisor, trying to staunch the flow of moderate intellectuals out of the country, strenuously argued that Kessler was not, technically speaking, a displaced scholar.' 48 In addition, as they struggled to preserve their limited resources, relief organizations had begun to insist on promises that a host institution would consider permanently appointing a displaced scholar at the end of his or her subsidized term. 14 9 (The Emergency Committee and Rockefeller Foundation would often bend this rule in the late 1930s.) In authorizing Clark to negotiate with these agencies, Yale University President James Angell had directed him not to make any such promise. 15 -even Yale's eclectic menu of courses. 160 Powerful faculty members at the Law School, already aggrieved by the modest curricular extensions adopted in the 1920s and 1930s, had no desire to see their institution devolve from an elite professional training ground into (in Corbin's words) a "second rate school of 'political science'.' 6 1 Even Arnold agreed that such a result, which "would be disapproved of by every one," could conceivably result from a concentration of "general and theoretical courses on administrative and constitutional law.' 6 2
Loewenstein thus had an uphill battle to prove his worth to the law faculty. Soon after his arrival at Yale, he began to audit Borchard's classes. 16 
IV.
Kessler and Rheinstein represented the two most obvious success stories among displaced scholars. Their experiences were far from typical. Both of these men were uniquely skilled and, because of their prior experience with American law, distinctly advantaged. Even as Kessler and Rheinstein found their places in American academia, forces were at work that increasingly predisposed U.S. law professors against accepting foreign jurists, and particularly older scholars, as peers. This article has already discussed one of these developments, namely the travails of Nussbaum and Laun. Their struggles suggested that among the refugees, the younger scholars were the better bet to become useful contributors to American scholarship and the day-to-day work of operating a law school. As retaining a foreign jurist was perceived less and less as a costless, short-term favor, this teaching became increasingly important. Yet this was just one of several influences altering American attitudes toward the deposed scholars during the latter half of the 1930s.
Most important, American academia devoted great energy during this period to the formulation of an intellectual and, more fundamentally, cultural response to the crisis overseas. The reply eventually adopted by American law professors led away from the
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Continental example. In 1930, Smith had said, "the similarities between the civil and the common law systems .. .are more striking than their differences.' 8 6 Smith had drawn this inference after observing "the many similarities in other phases of the culture of western Europe and of the United States." 18 7 But just a few years later, America and Germany seemed animated by very different principles. The Nazis' constricting grasp was twisting German higher education into a mouthpiece for their views.' 8 8 Through a combination of law and lawlessness the Nazis were intensifying their persecution of minorities and dissidents. Smith's logic now suggested that the American and Continental legal systems, like their cultures, were quite different indeed. American law professors, meanwhile, strained to identify and support those aspects of their system that would ensure what was happening in Germany would not be repeated here.
A visceral negative response to all things German represented the bluntest, though also the least prevalent, manifestation of American legal academia's response to the foreign crisis. Landis spoke to such sentiments when he advised one foreign applicant for a teaching position in 1940 that, insofar as the difficulty involved with placing foreign scholars at U.S. schools was concerned, "Recent events in Europe indicate that this problem will become more serious than otherwise and that it will also be exaggerated by a sense of hostility towards any person whose nationality is German." American law professors also sought to identify and cordon off democracy-enhancing legal philosophies. Motivated by a belief that although foreign philosophers had much to say, it was also true that "Americans already have developed theories and philosophies of law worthy of serious attention," My Philosophy of Law: Credos of Sixteen American Scholars was published in 1941.190 Many American professors also put the imprimaturs of their institutions on denunciations of the Nazis, as when in fall 1938 the law faculties at schools such as Yale, Chicago, Michigan and the University of California -Berkeley unanimously joined a petition circulated by the University of Amsterdam implicitly protesting German oppression. 19 I sometimes suspect that those who would remove all concepts and all ideals from the field of law, fail to think through the results and consequences of their goose-step philosophy. I wonder if they realize just where this logic leads when it is carried out to the last degree. This act-firstand-explain-later formula is certainly the dominant objective both in pragmatic and realist philosophies of law. It is likewise a dominant factor in the jurisprudence of the dictator nations. "Law," says a German jurist, "is that which is useful to the German nation." "Law," says another Nazi in- The community among scholars transcends separation of the universities in which they work for their common goal of advancement of knowledge. Members of one university faculty cannot be isolationist with respect to academic freedom for their colleagues in other faculties .... In times of stress especially, universities must safeguard the value of academic freedom not only to perform their function in our culture but to set an example of tolerance and freedom in a democracy. It seems likely that some displaced scholars were caught in the downdraft induced by the backlash against positivist and realist jurisprudence. 19 8 This was an overly facile reaction. Knowledgeable American professors who were philosophically at odds with German positivism nevertheless campaigned on the refugees' behalf,' 99 and some displaced scholars were powerful critics of both nihilistic realism and the Nazi regime. 20 0 At the time, though, only sixteen of sixty-six schools surveyed by the AALS in 1933 even offered a jurisprudence course, 20 1 much less had a professor devoted solely to jurisprudence. In such an environment, the broadside charge that foreign scholars advocated, or at least were influenced by, legal theories dangerous to democracy was a powerful and persuasive accusation. At a minimum, the refugees and their advocates were forced into a defensive posture. In recommending Hans Kelsen for an appointment at the University of Illinois Law School in 1939, Wigmore was forced to volunteer that the Austrian was of a "philosophic temperament and in no sense a propagandist." 20 2
In a related manifestation of their desire to protect and celebrate the American approach, U.S. law professors rallied around the training of effective lawyer-citizens as their paramount goal and purpose.
As recently as the late 1920s, neither Yale Law School nor Columbia Law School, both of which critics charged were adrift in "a fog of 'legal science'," ' 203 had identified professional training as its primary purpose. 20 4 But by the mid-1930s drastic cuts in research budgets, the development of the federal government as a source of jobs for graduates, and the perceived threat to democratic institutions all caused law schools to reject certain "scientific" approaches toward legal study as either too technical or too abstract, and to adopt in their place Conant's university-wide goal of producing "well-rounded, intelligent and useful citizens." 20 5 It became accepted that, as Sidney Post Simpson wrote in a 1938 article describing Harvard Law School's revised curriculum, "The public character of the lawyer's function and the duty of the university law school to communicate to its students a sense of responsibility and the ideals of what should be a profession of justice cannot be too much stressed." 20 6 Other prominent U.S. law professors also began to speak to an unmet need to produce properly civic-minded Americans. Delivering the keynote speech at the 1940 AALS annual meeting, Simpson's colleague, Edmund Morgan, asked his peers, "How many of us have been entirely satisfied with training men to become good craftsmen and skilled technicians? Hasn't the time come when we, in common with other educators, should take new thought of our objectives?" 20 7
He continued, "When so many of us see that what we have always taken for solid rock is crumbling like sand, is it not time for a reexamination of our premises? Must we not determine what we consider fundamental values in any really civilized society, and build thereon for the changing order?" 20 8 Anticipating Morgan's questions, professors at the University of Chicago believed that within the law school, "American institutions of democracy need to be stated in definite terms as to their content, meaning, their expressions in action, the participation possibilities by individuals, the distortions and abuses of these principles, and the results thereof. ' 20 9 At Northwestern, Green wrote the University's vice president in 1938 that, "To think of a law school, the study of law, a law school faculty worth its salt, and not to think of the government problems of today and the ones coming tomorrow is impossible. Also to think of a lawyer without thinking of courage, free speech and tolerance is impossible." 210 A few years later, Yale Law School's Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell would both sum up these sentiments and take them one step further in a famous Yale Law Journal article. "The proper function of our law schools is," they wrote, "in short, to contribute to the training of policy-makers for the ever more complete achievement of the democratic values that constitute the professed ends of American polity." 21 1 This sentiment more often manifested itself in internal memoranda, speeches and law-review articles than in substantive curricular changes. The preferred approach followed Simpson's advice that "imparting of such moral education must proceed indirectly and interstitially but always pervasively in each law teacher's instruction and in his relations with his students." 212 The University of Chicago went further than most other schools with its "New Plan" for the curriculum, "designed not only to prepare students for professional activities as advocates and counselors on legal matters, but also to prepare them for judicial, legislative and administrative positions. '2 13 Even in the post-World War II era, critics would maintain that law schools were still not doing enough to train students for public service. 21 4 Aligning the law-school curriculum toward this goal was a difficult and delicate task, though. On the one hand, American law professors wanted to inculcate democratic values in their charges; on the other, these scholars had no desire turn the law-school experience into a lengthy civics lesson or, as Corbin stated, a second-rate education in political science.
And so instead of overhauling law schools' curricula, American educators preferred to posit that legal education in their country already came close to its goal of producing properly directed counselors and required only marginal improvement. In making this argument, these scholars often compared the educations received by American and Continental law students. In such comparisons, the foreign programs always came up short. 21 657 (1935) (asserting that German legal education was "overtheoretical" and "second-rate, or third" compared to American schooling). Interest-instruction in Jurisprudence, Roman Law or Comparative Law" -not coincidentally the three subjects most closely associated with refugee scholars -"will never make up for an incapacity to express oneself or for an inability to think with precision and direction." 2 16 Such charges built upon longstanding criticisms of German scholarship (and, to some extent, legal realism), attacks acknowledged and seconded by Riesenfeld in a 1937 Michigan Law Review article:
The whole trend of the continental law school education appears more academic and less practical, at least less technical, than that in American law schools. Good professors try to avoid everything that resembles the 'trade school spirit.' ... This has the effect that not seldom the professor loses himself in theoretical speculations which are important only to him, and do not interest the student, and which are particularly boring because there is little contact between class and professor by reason of the lecture method. Thus the legal issues seem more abstract, and sometimes the students get the impression that mere theoretical philosophy is being taught to them, the real implications of which vanish from their eyes."
2 17
This type of criticism of Continental academia naturally worked to the displaced scholars' detriment. The practical tone and nationalistic bent of American legal education's new direction, meanwhile, meant a smaller role for foreign educators. Foreign law professors were generally deemed unfit to provide students with the "cultural education" law schools were now considered themselves responsible for providing. 2 18 For example, the late 1930s witnessed some growth in the number of jurisprudence courses offered by law schools. 219 These trends were well-developed by the time a second, significantly larger "wave" of refugees sought entry into the American academic establishment. Forced not only from Germany but also Austria, Czechoslovakia, and then the rest of Europe, 223 for many of these individuals a job offer from an American institution was literally a lifesaver. Under U.S. immigration law, a person coming to America to accept a teaching position typically was exempted from the immigration quota applicable to their country of residence. 2 24 As the persecution of minorities intensified in Europe, these exemptions offered an escape route from increasingly dangerous places. For foreign jurists, however, job opportunities in America were scarce. In particular, older, well-established scholars -once the group most in demand among U.S. law schools -found it very difficult to find places in American academia, in part because they were closely associated with a German legal system and academic approach that, in Americans' eyes, had plainly failed. Yale was disappointed with its new recruit. The few students who attended Neuner's seminars offered unfavorable reviews. The faculty concluded at the end of Neuner's three-year term that he "had been unable to adjust himself to the method of approach at this school. '2 4 7 Specifically, echoing criticisms often lodged against Continental jurists by that time, the faculty concluded that Neuner had "either devoted himself to work on the highly abstract philosophical plane to which he had been accustomed, or to ineffectual attempts to analyze problems in terms of the functional approach." 248 Neuner had received a better opportunity than most other refugee scholars. The story of the AALS's Special Committee on Refugee Scholars more accurately summed up the'situation facing displaced law teachers in the late 1930s. In 1938, Landis arrived at the AALS's annual meeting with an ambitious plan to assist displaced scholars by identifying open teaching posts in America and creating a clearinghouse for these jobs. As discussed at the conference, a committee would uncover and publicize job openings, actively screen and recommend refugee candidates for the positions, and secure the financial aid necessary for placement. 25 2 Landis failed to follow through with his grand plans. Landis did write letters of introduction and recommendation on behalf of some foreign acquaintances, 253 but by all indications he lost interest in his larger project soon after addressing the AALS conference. He never fleshed out the plan with Dean Smith and Yale's James Grafton Rogers, the two other professors appointed to the committee charged with developing the program. 254 Smith and Rogers simply received the two-page report Landis drafted upon pressure to produce something before the next year's conference. 2 55 By his own account, Landis based this report on little more than discussions with (unidentified) refugees and fellow law-school administrators, as well as a review of the many resumes he had received from displaced scholars looking for teaching positions in the United States.
56
Unsurprisingly, the report of the "Special Committee on Refugee Scholars" offered discouraging news to displaced jurists and their advocates. The report announced that although a few placements had been made, "the results along this line have been very scant." Fault was not assigned to American law schools. Instead according to the report the blame lay with two fatal shortcomings among the refugees. First, "these scholars, generally speaking, have equipment only in the Civil Law or in Roman Law." Second, "most of these scholars have not as yet been acclimated to the American academic atmosphere and may be somewhat deficient in the use of the English language." 2 5 7 The report also cast doubt on the efficacy of the Rockefeller Foundation's and Emergency Committee's grantmaking efforts, concluding that they "look[] forward to a permanent commitment and in these days of dwindling budgets and decreasing enrollments schools are chary to increase their commitments." The report's sole positive recommendation was for schools to publicize any openings they might have for library staff, occasional lecturers, researchers, or teachers in the fields of comparative or Roman law.
258
Word of Landis's original plan had inspired hope, perhaps unrealistically, in many displaced scholars. 25 9 The final report listed far in the opposite direction. Much of what Landis ultimately wrote had a basis in fact. The elder representatives of the German tradition had not lived up to expectations. Most foreign applicants pitched themselves only as potential teachers of comparative law, international law, or jurisprudence. 260 And many American professors now perceived foreign legal scholarship as being either dangerous or of marginal utility. On the other hand, experience with scholars such as Kessler and Rheinstein had shown that, with a few years of grantsubsidized training, some foreigners could become skilled instructors in American law. In criticizing the relief agencies' efforts, the report gratuitously assailed one of the few mechanisms through which these individuals could rebut the presumptions they battled against.
A more successful relief program took shape at the same AALS conference where Landis announced his plan for aiding displaced jurists. Throughout the 1930s, U.S. law schools embraced opportunities to re-educate foreign students in American law. Law schools even provided some refugee students with scholarships. 2 61 A few of these pupils had been assistant professors or attorneys in Germany. Upon learning that there were no teaching jobs open to them in the United States, and that most states did not allow non-citizens to practice law, 26 2 they sought to train themselves in American law. At the 1938 AALS conference, American law schools met to develop a coordinated plan for the "rehabilitation" of displaced scholars and lawyers.
2 63
Professors from the law schools at Harvard, Yale and elsewhere agreed on the need for such a program, which several months later materialized in the Committee for the Re-education of Refugee Lawyers.
26 4
This Committee ultimately sponsored two "classes" of refugee students, totaling twenty-eight foreign lawyers, at twenty-one different law schools. 26 5 Funding came from New York attorneys and the efforts of the host law schools. 26 6 Institutions that had refused to accept Rockefeller Foundation or Emergency Committee grants for the purpose of hosting a refugee participated in the program. Significantly, the Committee did not focus upon a candidate's academic record in deciding whether to award a fellowship. Rather, as the University of Buffalo's David Riesman (the Committee's Secretary) explained, by the time of the Committee's efforts other factors had become accepted as more important in gauging a refugee's potential contribution to American law: "[Wie did not search for distinguished scholars ... but rather for men of shrewd common sense and flexible vitality, with sufficient academic distinction to enable them to make a not-too-difficult adjustment to the study of Law in the United States." 26 7 After retraining, some of these scholars did seek to resume or initiate careers as law professors in the United States. Even though the Committee professed that it chose fellowship recipients on the basis of "what they could contribute to American law practice, and not as objects of charity or as prospective academicians," 268 once fellows had completed their reschooling, the Committee praised their "unusually wide backgrounds and extensive pedagogical experience" and added that "[l]aw schools anxious for 'double-discipline' teachers may find among this group men able to step into any of the courses in the usual curriculum. '2 69 Other American professors suggested that hiring re-educated scholars represented "part of our attempt to make democracy mean what it seems to mean." 2 70 These endorsements proved successful in placing some fellowship recipients in teaching positions. 271 There were few financial incentives to participate in the Committee's fellowship program. Indeed, at sixty years' remove it seems odd that law schools embraced the Committee's efforts to the extent that they did. At the same time as they accepted foreign students, even engaging in laborious fundraising efforts to support them, schools were rejecting offers of gratis (by virtue of Emergency Committee and Rockefeller Foundation grants) service from foreign law professors whom, as Yale Law School's experience with Neuner demonstrated, they had no real obligation to retain at the end of their subsidized terms. The difference, perhaps, owed to the fact that accepting displaced professors as peers sent a mixed message. It was a protest against Nazi abuses, but also suggested a connection to real and imagined Continental approaches and practices from which Americans of the time sought to distance themselves. By focusing upon "reeducating" refugees in American law, American schools could channel humanitarian impulses toward a program more squarely aligned with American legal education's new direction. Retraining efforts, by baptizing foreign jurists in what John Langbein has called the "Cult of the Common Law,"272 implicitly asserted the superiority and success of the American legal system.
VI.
In 1940, the University of Indiana Law School's Jerome Hall wrote, "It is evident that the torch of legal scholarship has been handed to the United States -not as a temporary matter, but for an indefinite future." 27 3 The "scientific reputation" of German universities was in shambles, and its proudest representatives had been reduced to supplicants. Relief agencies and American professors agreed that it had become next to impossible to find teaching positions for Continental jurists at U.S. law schools. In 1939, the director of the Emergency Committee had concluded, "The one field in which we have discovered there is practically no hope of assistance is that of law." 2 74 At around the same time, Borchard wrote, "A German lawyer is almost useless here and must turn to something else. A few younger men specializing in international law have been accommodated in various places as research assistants and even instructors, but the older men are extremely hard to accommodate.
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These comments were to some extent hyperbole; even as they were written some law schools remained willing to host displaced scholars for limited terms, 2 7 6 and organized attempts to retrain young 6migr6s were just getting underway. These views, however, sounded in a genuine sea change in American legal academia's relationship with Continental (and especially German) scholars and scholarship. Many American jurists of the 1920s characterized their work as a science, a term suggestive of universal commonalities and truths. The 1930s forcefully reminded Americans of the differences across legal systems, and among those who made their livings by explicating and refining them. American law professors took to emphasizing these differences, and their own unique relationship with and responsibilities to American legal system, as sources of professional meaning.
Refugee scholars, and especially older ones, continued to believe that American interest in "the common cause of the science of law" and the "scientific reputation" of Continental scholarship would bring them appointments and respect in the United States. By the late 1930s, this assessment incorporated two faulty assumptions: first, that American law professors still hoped to identify similarities across legal regimes; fnd second, that German scientism still possessed the appeal among law faculties that it had held in the late 1800s. But the demise of the rule of law in Germany had made American professors interested in differentiating their laws, institutions and methods from the Continental example. The resulting environment proved inhospitable to refugee jurists, and particularly to the scholars who were most closely associated with the perceived failures of the German legal system and seen as the least capable of learning American ways.
In such a climate, those dmigr~s who found significant places in American academia were generally young, flexible individuals already familiar with or capable of quickly mastering U.S. law, or persons who submitted to re-education at an American law school. In the postwar era, these survivors would become some of America's more influential law and political science professors. Their thoughts course through the pages of this journal, and wherever their fields are practiced today.
